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INTRODUCTION
If a growing number of legal scholars are correct in arguing
that the prohibition of preemptive self-defense set forth in
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is no longer reasonable, is there
some other set of rules that govern the ability of states to
engage in preemptive force? Quantitative data suggests that
states implicitly have agreed to be bound by a different set of
rules, apart from Article 51, and condone some amount of
preemptive force in the interstate system. This means that a
new norm of customary law has emerged that supersedes the
statutory obligations set forth in the Charter.
This Note is divided into five main parts. Part I
summarizes approaches to international law, distinguishing
statutory law from customary law. Part II describes
international customary and statutory law of preemptive force
by summarizing the theoretical justifications for preemptive
force, the prohibition of preemptive force by Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, and the various scholarly arguments critiquing
the application of Article 51 (statutory law) to real behavior of
states (customary law). This Note does not weigh the merits of
these legal theories. Instead, Part II situates this Note in the
vast scholarly literature on Article 51, noting that this
literature, although critical of Article 51, does not set out to
measure whether there exists a new customary law of
preemptive force that supersedes the U.N. Charter.
Part III looks to quantitative data to analyze state behavior
regarding preemptive force since the adoption of the U.N.
Charter. Part III introduces sources of empirical data, discusses
methodological issues, and explains and justifies the assumption
that the data can be parsed to isolate instances of preemptive
force. Part IV reports initial findings of this project that confirm
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the argument that states do not follow Article 51's statutory
prohibition on preemptive force. The data also shows
remarkable patterns of consistency over time regarding
interstate use of preemptive force. This Note posits that these
empirical trends provide strong evidence of a new norm of
customary law that governs state behavior independent of
Article 51. In other words, it is a new form of customary law,
and not statutory law, that controls state behavior regarding
preemptive force. Finally, Part V summarizes the findings of
the quantitative research, proposes questions for future
research, and offers a cautionary note on the implications of
these findings in a world increasingly troubled by terrorists,
rogue states, and WMD.
I. APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
The difficulty in interpreting international law stems from
the condition of international anarchy.2 Within nations, both
laws and law enforcement exist; between nations laws exist but
law enforcement does not.3 Within a country, the presence of
law enforcement means that most people act (custom) in
accordance with the written law (statute).4 Between nations,
custom often diverges from statute.5 As custom is a crucial
reference point for the formulation and interpretation of law,
the capriciousness of custom under anarchy hinders the
formulation and interpretation of international law.6  The
resulting uncertainty produces wide-open debates about
international law.7
A. CUSTOMARY LAW
Most scholars consider customary law to be at the core of
international law.8 Customary international law is formally
2. See, e.g., JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS
30 (2001); KENNETH N. WALTz, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
3. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 2, at 30.
4. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA.
J. INT'L L. 449, 459-65 (2000) (explaining the concept of customary law and the
authority problem).
5. See Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L.
REV. 699, 701 (2005).
6. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1999).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., id. at 1113; Kelly, supra note 4, at 451.
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defined as a "general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation."9 Thus, there are two
elements to this definition: (1) the general and consistent
practice of states; and (2) the sense of legal obligation, or opinio
juris.10
By definition, customary law can be a better reflection of
actual behavior than statutory law.'1
For example, if the speed limit on a road is fifty-five miles per hour
[statutory law], but it is widely accepted that one may travel at sixty
miles per hour without repercussions [customary law--consistent
behavior and sense of legal obligation], then the speed limit has
established a new normative standard (fifty-five plus five) that
individuals accept as appropriate for judging deviant behavior.12
There is an extensive body of literature concerning why
nations comply with customary international law, what it
means to comply with customary international law, and how
customary international law changes over time. 3 Despite the
scholarly attention given to this topic, there is no "common
understanding of how customary international legal norms are
formed, nor agreement on" their content. 14 Thucydides, an
ancient Greek historian and the author of the History of the
Peloponnesian War, came close to identifying the origins of
custom as a source of law: The strong do what they want, and
then it becomes law.'5  Modern theorists argue that
international norms influence the behavior of states because
weak states are easily influenced by the behavior of strong
states.1 6 There is a substantial body of empirical evidence
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §102(2) (1987). Similarly, Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) defines custom as "evidence of a general practice accepted as
law." Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm. Legal scholar Anthony
D'Amato asserts that the importance of custom "is rooted in the desire of the
international community for order and security-aims which are indistinguishable
from the meaning of 'law.'" ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 270 (1971).
10. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at 1116.
11. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 453, 458.
12. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 724.
13. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at 1114 n.2.
14. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 450.
15. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 394 (R. Crowley trans.,
1920).
16. See David Sloss, Do International Norms Influence State Behavior?, 38
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 159, 163 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A.
[Vol. 16:1
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supporting this position.17
Customary rules develop in a decentralized manner over
time based on social interaction, not because they are imposed
by a central authority.18 Historically, the time period required
before state behavior hardened into customary law has been
lengthy, often over many decades.19 Recently, others have
argued that custom is a dynamic process that can change
rapidly or even instantly.20
There is also much scholarly debate concerning what
constitutes evidence of custom. 2' There is wide disagreement
over whether the substance of customary law is best determined
by normative or positivist techniques. 22 Scholars like Goldsmith
and Posner note that customary law can be examined
empirically. 23 Nevertheless, courts and scholars increasingly
tend to ignore empirical evidence of state practice and instead
base their arguments on theory.24 Those who favor an empirical
approach to determining customary international law find the
normative approach to be premature. 25 They argue that most
customary international 'norms' asserted in the scholarly
literature are declared without evidence of general and
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005)).
17. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1762-80 (2003) (summarizing empirical
evidence that states exhibit a variety of institutional and organizational similarities
resulting from global forces that induce states to imitate other states). But see
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 16 (arguing that international norms do not
influence state behavior because each state acts in its own self-interest).
18. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 464.
19. Katherine N. Guernsey, Comment, The North Continental Shelf Cases, 27
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 141, 143 (2000).
20. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a
Divided World, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 513 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M.
Johnston eds., 1983); Bejamin Langille, Note, It's "Instant Custom": How the Bush
Doctrine Became Law After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 145 (2003).
21. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 455. See generally EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE, SERIES A, CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw-MAKING
(Antonio Cassese & Joseph H. H. Weiler eds., 1988) (discussing how change in
international law affect what qualifies as evidence of custom).
22. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 458 (discussing the debate between normativists
and posivitists).
23. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at 1121.
24. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REV. 815,
839-40 (1997) (citing examples).
25. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 458.
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consistent state practice. 26  They argue that non-empirical
customs have no authority from the international community;
therefore, application of them as international law is
inappropriate.27 Instead, they advise scholars to look to positive
acts of states to provide the evidence of the underlying norm.28
For these commentators, repetitive practice is the only material
evidence of a customary law.29
B. STATUTORY LAW
The statutory approach to international law is based on
treaties that are written and signed by the nations involved.30
The involvement of the signatories should serve to facilitate
interpretation of the law and help ensure compliance.31
However, the lack of international law enforcement means that
the cost of breaking international law is often very low. 32 This
invites nations to interpret and follow the law expediently
rather than correctly. 33  Nonetheless, the tangible and
consensual nature of statutory law makes it the most concrete
point of departure for analysis of international law.34
26. See id. at 453.
27. See id. at 456.
28. See id. at 458.
29. Cf id. at 461 (discussing the opposing normativist contention that
customary law "is not mere practice or habitual behavior, rather it is a normative
order consisting of rights and duties abstracted from practice").
30. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at 1170-72.
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International
Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 501, 515 n.35 (2004) (discussing the major costs a
nation considers when contemplating violating an international agreement).
33. See ROBERT J. BECK, ANTHONY CLARK AREND, & ROBERT D. VANDER LUGT,
INERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 305 (noting that state compliance with international law is unpredictable
when international rules conflict with specific policy goals).
34. The traditional starting point for sources of international law is Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (which is itself a form of
statutory law). Id. at 296. Article 38 lists, in the following order, the sources of
international law: statutory law, customary law, general principles of law, judicial
decisions, and other academic sources. Statute of the International Court of Justice
art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
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Summary of Approaches to International Law
Paradigm: Statutory Customary
Laws & actions International treaties Practice and precedent
based on: and agreements
Binds: Signatories All nations
Reflects consent of Laws/standards have
Advantages: nations; Prohibits best fit to international
cross-border violence; behavior; Is not empty
Permits self-defense rhetoric
Often does not reflect Standards are vague and
Disadvantages: practice of nations; often contradictory;
Low cost to break law Interpretation is difficult
Respects: Treaties Practice
Neglects: Practice Ideals
Application to U.N. Charter arts. Concepts of imminence,
preemptive 2(4) and 51 necessity, and
force: proportionality
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PREEMPTIVE FORCE
A. CUSTOMARY LAW PRIOR TO THE U.N. CHARTER: THE
CAROLINE STANDARD
For centuries, the international system has recognized that
states have an inherent right to defend themselves from
aggression. 35 The first formal declaration of self-defense can be
traced to the now infamous Caroline case.36 During a 19th
century uprising against British rule in Canada, some of the
anti-British rebels operated from American soil in New York,
just across the Canadian border.37 Britain asked the U.S. to
prevent the rebels from using New York as a sanctuary and
base of operations, but the U.S. took no action.38 In retaliation,
35. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 701.
36. Details of the Caroline case are recounted in R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline
and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 82-92 (1938).
37. Id. at 82-83.
38. Id. at 83.
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British forces staged a small raid over the Canadian border and
into New York.39 The British seized the Caroline, a vessel used
by the rebels to navigate from New York into Canada, set it
ablaze and dumped the ship over Niagara Falls.40 The U.S.
claimed the British had violated their territorial sovereignty.
41
Britain responded by asserting self-defense.4 2 Daniel Webster,
the U.S. Secretary of State, explained that the burden was on
the British to demonstrate a "necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation" and that acts were not "unreasonable or
excessive"; only then would Britain's actions be deemed
legitimate.43 Webster's definition of self-defense, which focused
on imminence, necessity, and proportionality, has become the
universally accepted standard for lawful self-defense.
44
B. STATUTORY LAW: THE U.N. CHARTER
In 1945, world leaders gathered in San Francisco to draft
the U.N. Charter as a means to enforce a lasting peace following
World War 11. 4 5 Under Article 2(4) of the Charter, the authors
categorically proscribed "the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state."
46
Although broadly drafted, Article 2(4) prohibits only three
specific applications of force in international relations:
" the threat or use of force to the territorial integrity
of states;
" the threat or use of force contrary to the political
independence of states; and
39. Id. at 83-84.
40. Id. at 84.
41. Id. at 85-86.
42. Id. at 85-87.
43. Letter from Daniel Webster, Secretary of State of the United States, to
Henry S. Fox, Esq., Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her
Britannic Majesty (Apr. 24, 1841), reprinted in 29 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1129,
1137-38 (1857). For a discussion of the Caroline case, see Thomas Graham, Jr.,
National Self-Defense, International Law, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 4 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 1, 6-8 (2003).
44. For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal, see International Military Tribunal
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences (Oct. 1, 1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
172, 205 (1947), and the ICJ, see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 176 (June 27), have given the definition positive
treatment.
45. See History of the United Nations, It 4, 6,
http://www.un.org/aboutun/unhistory.
46. U.N. Charter art. 2(4), para. 4.
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* the threat or use of force "in any manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations,"47 i.e., the "maint[enance ofi international
peace and security."48
Article 51, however, recognizes the "inherent right" of a
state subjected to aggression to engage in self-defense:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
49
Reading Article 2(4) in conjunction with Article 51 yields
the conclusion that states may only use force as an act of self-
defense. 50 Article 51 is not an affirmative grant of self-defense,
however. Rather, it is a statement of situations in which the
"inherent right" is not precluded by the Charter. Even those
situations are limited by time, or "until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security."51
C. COMPETING STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE U.N.
CHARTER
Since the adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945,
international lawyers have articulated very different views
regarding the legality of preemptive force. In his recent article,
"The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense," Professor Sean D.
Murphy summarizes and condenses these arguments into four
main schools of thought: "the strict constructionist school, the
imminent threat school, the qualitative threat school, and the
47. Id.
48. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
49. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
50. See William C. Bradford, "The Duty to Defend Them": A Natural Law
Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365,
1377 (2004); Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24
MICH. J. INT'L L. 513, 521-22 (2003).
51. Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Article 51: Limits of Self-Defense?, 13 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 336, 339-40 (1992) (quoting U.N. Charter art. 51).
2007]
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'charter is dead' school."52 Murphy distinguishes the schools by
the relative importance each places on two main considerations:
the ordinary meaning of the U.N. Charter and the importance of
state behavior since 1945. 53 The ordinary meaning of the U.N.
Charter is important as a matter of statutory law.54 Post-1945
state practice is relevant for the purposes of: (1) interpreting the
meaning of the Charter, because the parties' conduct
demonstrates the parties' interpretation of the meaning; and (2)
establishing a new norm of customary law that might supersede
the Charter. 55
1. The Strict Constructionist School
Strict constructionists rely heavily on the ordinary meaning
of the statutory language of the Charter. 56 They read Article
2(4) broadly to prohibit the use of force by one state against
another. 57  For strict constructionists, there are only two
exceptions to the prohibition on force: (1) Security Council
authorization, 5 and (2) self-defense pursuant to Article 51.59
When analyzing an act of self-defense under Article 51,
strict constructionists tend to focus on the phrase "if an armed
attack occurs."60 To strict constructionists, preemptive force is
always illegal because, by definition, an "armed attack" has not
52. Murphy, supra note 5, at 703.
53. See id. at 706-19.
54. See id. at 721.
55. See id. at 720.
56. See id. at 706-11 (characterizing the Strict Constructionist school).
57. Id. at 706-07.
58. See generally ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 133-49 (2004) (discussing power of Security Council
under Chapter VII and "the threshold that triggers Chapter VII action"); U.N.
Charter, art. 39-51, (setting forth U.N. procedures for handling threats to peace,
breaches of peace, and acts of aggression, including Security Council authorization
of use of force against states that aggressively threaten peace).
59. See U.N. Charter, supra note 46, at art. 51.
60. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 797-98 (1951) (arguing that Article 51's allowance of use
of force in self-defense applies only when nation faces actual armed attack and,
therefore, no "imminent" threat of attack can justify armed aggression under Article
51); 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 156 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
Longmans, Green & Co. 7th ed. 1952) (noting that U.N. Charter "confines the right
of armed self-defence [sic] to the case of an armed attack as distinguished from
anticipated attack or from various forms of unfriendly conduct falling short of armed
attack").
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yet occurred. 61 The plain language of Article 51 clearly dictates
that a state must wait until "an armed attack occurs" before it
lawfully can resort to self-defense as a justification for using
force that would otherwise be banned by Article 2(4).62 For
strict constructionists, the plain meaning of "armed attack"
seems to characterize overt military action, such as armies
crossing borders, air forces dropping bombs, or navies firing
missiles.6 3  If the requirement of an "armed attack" were
loosened, they argue, it would be impossible to determine
whether states were invoking Article 51 out of a legitimate need
for self-defense, or if they were concealing their own aggressive
intentions under the encompassing veil of Article 51.64 Strict
constructionists contend that a more liberal reading of Article
51 would create a gaping loophole in the Charter's prohibition
on force as a means for resolving disputes between nations. 65
Strict constructionists further argue that a narrow reading
of Article 51 is confirmed by the legislative history.66 The
Charter drafters considered imposing limits on self-defense,
such as requiring it to be "imminent," "necessary," or
"reasonable."67 They ultimately decided to draw a bright line at
any "armed attack," because it could be objectively determined
and would eliminate uncertainty.68Many commentators point
out that this bright-line rule prohibiting any "armed attack" was
realistic because the drafters assumed that a powerful Security
Council would respond to all threats and make anticipatory self-
61. See 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 60.
62. See U.N. Charter, supra note 46, at art. 51. The U.N. General Assembly
has confirmed that the required level of aggression for a state legally use self-
defense under Article 51 is an armed attack. See DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION, G.A.
Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974),
http://www.un.orgdocuments/ga/res/29/ares29.htm.
63. Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure of
the Charter Framework, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 735, 739 (2002).
64. See Bradford, supra note 50, at 1387-1440.
65. See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 730-31(2004)
(characterizing the restrictivist "doctrinal" position of other scholars).
66. See, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
112-13 (1991) (discussing interpretations of Article 2(4) and noting that its words
may qualify as an all-inclusive prohibition against force but that the extent of this
prohibition is not clear from textual analysis alone); see also Timothy Kearly,
Regulation of Preventative and Preemptive Force in the United Nations Charter: A
Search for Original Intent, 3 Wyo. L. REV. 663 (2003) (discussing a thorough account
of Charter drafting process).
67. See generally Kearly, supra note 66, at 726-27.
68. See generally id.
20071
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defense a thing of the past.69
In fact, it was the U.S. that insisted on inserting the "if an
armed attack occurs" phrase.70 Green Hackworth, the State
Department's legal advisor, was worried that this language
"greatly qualified the right of self-defense," but Deputy U.S.
Negotiator Harold Stassen assured him that the language of
Article 51 was "intentional and sound."71 Stassen stated: "We
did not want exercised the right of self-defense before an armed
attack had occurred."72 When another member of the U.S.
delegation, Mr. Gates, "posed a question as to our freedom
under this provision in case a fleet had started from abroad
against an American republic, but had not yet attacked,"
Stassen replied that "we could not under this provision attack
the fleet but we could send a fleet of our own and be ready in
case an attack came."73 Strict constructionists maintain that
the internal debate shows Article 51 to mean exactly what it
says: that states may resort to self-defense only if an "armed
attack" has occurred and only until the Security Council takes
appropriate action.74 They further argue that the drafters of
Article 51 deliberately intended to close the door on the use of
preemptive force when they included the "armed attack"
standard. 75
Of the four schools, strict constructionists have placed the
least value on state behavior since 1945. They find evidence of
state practice too sparse and unconvincing to establish a
reinterpretation of Article 51.76
69. This was further coupled with the requirement that states seek Security
Council approval before they use defensive force. Id.
70. See Thomas M. Frank, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force
Without Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 51, 58
(2001).
71. Minutes of the Forty-Eighth Meeting (Executive Session), of the United
States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Sunday, May 20, 1945, 12 Noon, in 1
FOREIGN REL. OF THE U.S. 1945 at 813, 818 (1967).
72. Id.
73. Minutes of the Thirty-Eighth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held
at San Francisco, Monday, May 14, 1945, 9:05 a.m., in 1 FOREIGN REL. OF THE U.S.
1945 at 707, 709 (1967).
74. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 167
(Cambridge Univ. Press 3d ed. 2001).
75. The legislative history also reveals that the framers intended that the right
of self-defense, when invoked under Article 51, should exist at all times unless the
Security Council was to specifically forbid its exercise. See Plofchan, supra note 51,
at 347-50.
76. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 722.
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2. The Imminent Threat School
The imminent threat school also focuses on the ordinary
meaning of statutory language.77  However, whereas strict
constructionists focus on the "armed attack" phrase, the
imminent threat school emphasizes the language "nothing shall
impair the inherent right."78 For these scholars, Article 51
clearly protects the "inherent right" of self-defense that stems
from the Caroline standard. 79 Customary law prior to 1945
allowed a state to defend itself against an imminent attack.80
The imminent threat school argues that the plain language of
the U.N. Charter clearly protects this right.8'
The imminent threat school also reads the "armed attack"
language to include an imminent attack.8 2 They argue that
strict constructionists' restrictive reading of Article 51's "armed
attack" requirement necessarily limits states' "inherent right" to
self-defense under customary international law.8 3  The
imminent threat school believes that a restrictive reading of
Article 51 is nonsensical.8 4 They argue that Article 51 clearly
states that nothing "shall impair" the inherent right of states to
engage in self-defense, but then places two significant
constraints on the so-called "inherent" right that is supposedly
unimpaired.85 First, Article 51 dictates that states may not
exercise their "inherent" right to self-defense until an "armed
attack occurs."86  Second, Article 51 only allows states to
77. See id. at 712.
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., D.W. BOWETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 187 (1958)
(stating reference to "inherent right" in Article 51 indicates "an existing right,
independent of the Charter and not the subject of an express grant").
80. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., BOWETr, supra note 79, at 188-89 (arguing that Article 51
definitely allows right to self-defense and that this right has always been presumed
to be anticipatory).
82. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 712 (explaining how the imminent threat
school reads the phrase "if an armed attack occurs").
83. Id. at 739.
84. See Yoo, supra note 65, at 775 ("If a state instead were obligated to wait
until a threat was temporally imminent, it could miss a limited window of
opportunity to prevent the attack and to avoid harm to civilians.").
85. See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence and
Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY
539, 553-54 (2002) ("[The right to self-defense, supposedly protected from
impairment by the Charter, is permitted under the actual text of Article 51 to be
impaired to the extent the Security Council chooses to impair it (but the right of
course remains inherent).").
86. See id. at 553-54.
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exercise their "inherent" right to self-defense "until" the
Security Council takes action.87 Because it would be absurd for
the Charter text to say that it does not impair the "inherent
right," but then impair it twice, the imminent threat school
concludes that the original meaning of the Charter must
embrace Caroline's imminency standard.88
Post-1945 state practice is important to the imminent
threat school because it demonstrates that states accept the use
of preemptive force when an attack is imminent and
unavoidable.8 9 They believe the evidence proves that states
continue to abide by the traditional Caroline standard. 9°
3. The Qualitative Threat School
The qualitative threat school emphasizes dramatic changes
in the international landscape since 1945, particularly due to
WMD, rogue states, and terrorists. 91  For these scholars,
adhering either to a hyper-technical reading of Article 51 or the
Caroline imminence standard is a recipe for disaster in the
modern world.92 From a practical perspective, they argue that it
would be absurd to require a state to "take the first hit" when it
could effectively defend itself by acting preemptively. 93
These scholars believe that international law should
consider more than just temporal factors. 94 Rather, they believe
87. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
88. See, e.g., Derek W. Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and
Self-Defense, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 38, 38-40 (John Norton
Moore ed., 1974) (arguing that Article 51 was intended to preserve the "traditional
right" of self-defense, which included the right to take action against a threat before
actual armed attack occurred). As further evidence, the imminent threat school
cites the French translation of U.N. Charter, which is equally as authoritative as the
English version. The French translations preserves the right to self-defense "dans
un cas oti un Membre des Nations Unies est lobject d'une aggression arm~e" ("in a
situation where a Member of the United Nations is the object of an armed attack"),
which is a less restrictive formulation. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 419
(H. Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (1928) (analyzing other interpretations of French text
and finding room for uncertainty in interpretation).
89. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 722-23.
90. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
91. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 715.
92. See id.
93. Claude Humphrey & Meredith Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force
by Individual States in International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES CoURS 451, 498 (1952)
("[i t would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending State
to allow its assailant to deliver the first, and perhaps fatal blow.").
94. See, e.g., John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 563, 572-74 (2003) (examining the Caroline test in light of WMD and finding that
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preemptive force is legally justified when it is necessary and
proportional. 95 The test of necessity is met when there are no
peaceful means available to redress the grievance and the use of
force is a last resort.96 Proportionality requires that actions
taken in self-defense are proportional in scale and effect to the
original aggression. 97
Recent state behavior is especially important for the
qualitative threat school because it shows that modern
policymakers consider qualitative factors in addition to
imminence. 98 As examples of situations where preemptive force
would have been prohibited by strict constructionist and
imminent threat scholars, the qualitative threat school cites the
U.S. quarantine of Cuba, the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989,
and the U.S. attacks against Libya in 1986, Iraq in 1993, and
Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. In 2003, the U.S. justified
waging war on Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime as a legal act of
preemptive force. 99 In his address to the nation on March 17,
2003, President Bush rested his justification of intervention in
Iraq, not on the imminency of the threat, but largely on the
ground that "[i]n 1 year, or 5 years, the power of Iraq to inflict
harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over,"
and that failure to "meet the threat now, where it arises, before
it can appear suddenly in our skies and in our cities" would be
an act of "national suicide."100 In a more recent example, Israel
current test has become significantly more nuanced than Webster's Caroline
definition). See generally Mark L. Rockefeller, The "Imminent Threat" Requirement
for the Use of Preemptive Military Force: Is It Time For a Non-Temporal Standard?,
33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 131 (2004).
95. See, e.g., id.; Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 209, 219-20 (2003).
96. See Schmitt, supra note 50, at 530.
97. See id. at 531.
98. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 723.
99. In his speech before the U.N. in September 2002, President Bush
characterized the possible use of force against Iraq as necessary to eliminate a
dangerous threat to international peace and security. George W. Bush, U.S. Pres.,
President's Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 38 WKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1529 (Sept. 12, 2002) ("We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers
gather."), available at: http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-
1.html.
In another example (though prior to the U.N. Charter), the Nazis justified
the initial World War II attacks on the Soviet Union, Norway, and Denmark as self-
defense, fearing that Germany herself would be attacked first if she did not resort to
force. Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The case for anticipatory self
defense, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2002, at 24.
100. George W. Bush, U.S. Pres., President's Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39
WKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 338, 340 (Mar. 17, 2003). In fact, the Bush administration's
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claimed it was acting preemptively when it bombed southern
Lebanon in an attempt to wipe out the military capabilities of
Hezbollah, an alleged terrorist group stationed in Lebanon.
Many commentators 01 and political leaders, including U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 102 argued that Israel had a legal
right to self-defense.
4. The "Charter Is Dead" School
Members of the "charter is dead" school, also known as legal
realists, believe that Article 51 is no longer regarded as
obligatory by states and, as such, is no longer binding law.103 In
evaluating whether a rule rises to the level of an international
law, legal realists ask two questions: (1) whether the rule is
authoritative;10 4 and (2) whether it controls the behavior of
states. 105 They find that Article 51 fails on both counts. First,
they argue, Article 51 is not authoritative because states have
consistently claimed the right to use force in circumstances that
fall outside any reasonable interpretation of Article 51.106
National Security Strategy argues that "international law recognize[s] that nations
need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves
against forces that present an imminent danger of attack." WHITE HOUSE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002),
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. This is by no means a
revolutionary view in American foreign policy. Decades ago, Secretary of State
Frank Kellogg-negotiator of the Kellogg-Briand pact which outlawed war-noted
that the right of self-defense "is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in
every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to
defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide
whether the circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense." Frank B.
Kellogg, U.S. Sec'y of State, Address of the Honorable Frank B. Kellogg (Apr.28,
1928), in 22 Proc Am Socy Intl L 141, 143.
101. See, e.g., Richard Holbrooke, The Guns of August, WASH. POST, Aug. 10,
2006, at A23 ("Under the universally accepted doctrine of self-defense, which is
embodied in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, there is no question that Israel has a
legitimate right to take action against a group that has sworn to destroy it and had
hidden some 13,000 missiles in southern Lebannon.").
102. Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y Gen., Secretary-General's briefing to the Security
Council on the situation in the Middle East (July 20, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2142.
103. See Michael J. Glennon, How War Left The Law Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2002, at A37; Glennon, supra note 85, at 539-40.
104. State practice matures into customary law if the states engaging in the
practice believe that it is legally obligatory. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1986). See generally MARK
WIESBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR 11 (1997).
105. See Glennon, supra note 99.
106. See Arend, supra note 63, at 752.
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Second, Article 51 does not control state behavior because states
have used it hundreds of times in ways that violate the plain
language and intent of the rule.10 7 Legal realists conclude that
behavior that would otherwise be illegal under Article 51 is not
really unlawful because states do it all the time. 08 If states
truly wanted to enforce Article 51, realists contend that they
would have made the cost of violation greater than the perceived
benefits. 0 9
The "charter is dead" school maintains that Article 51 has
no bearing on state decision-making." 0 In the real world, they
argue, rules will not work if they do not "reflect the underlying
geopolitical realities" of how states operate."1 They believe that
international law regarding preemptive force exists in two
separate universes: de jure (a set of illusory rules in world of
forms that does not exist) and de facto (the rules that actually
guide state behavior in the international system).1 2 Excessive
violation of a rule of international law, whether statutory or
customary, causes the rule to be supplanted either by another
rule or no rule at all." 3 At the end of the day, states will
continue to set rules (or no rules) for themselves pertaining to or
proscribing the legality of preemptive force, not because of
Article 51, but because their survival is at stake." 4 For realists,
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J.
939, 940 (2005) ("When deviant behavior reaches the point that the first violation
has been emulated by a sufficient number of states, the conduct in question ceases to
be a violation."); Glennon, supra note 85, at 549 ("Article 51 is grounded upon
premises that neither accurately describe nor realistically prescribe state
behavior."); Yoo, supra note 65, at 739, 745-50; W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the
Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 279, 280 (1985)
(suggesting that states have ignored the Charter provisions governing the use of
force, and modified the role of the Security Council, by practice).
109. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 85, at 549.
110. It is important to note that legal realists believe Article 51 is not relevant to
decision-making as a matter of law. That is, a policy maker does not worry about
the fact that his decision to use force is legally prohibited by Article 51. As Professor
Yoo remarks, however, Article 51 might be relevant in terms of reputational damage
which decreases a state's ability to enter international agreements, limits it's
credibility in negotiating with other nations, and signals overall untrustworthiness.
See Yoo, supra note 65, at 796.
111. See Glennon, supra note 85, at 557.
112. Id. at 540. The point of legal realism is to say what the law is, not what it
should be. Id. at 557.
113. See Glennon, supra note 108, at 940.
114. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 56-58 (1993) (stating that
states "are simply not committed enough to the principle of collective security to be
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there is no point in splitting legal hairs about how to read the
plain language of Article 51 because it is completely devoid of
any legally significant normative value.115
Legal realists note that the statutory law created by the
Charter failed because the drafters of the Charter designed
their system to prevent the last war, not the next.1 6 They argue
that Article 51 failed because it was based on two wrong
assumptions: that the Security Council would make fast and
objective decisions when collective action was necessary, and
that states would give the Security Council the authority to
police their affairs." 7
For members of the "charter is dead" school, post-1945
practice of states can only yield the conclusion that states do not
adhere to the Charter in any legally meaningful way. Legal
realists contend that hard evidence demonstrates that any
reading of Article 51 has proven impracticable in the real
world.1' 8 Since the adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945, there
have been over 1,500 occurrences of aggression in the interstate
system. 19 In every one of these conflicts, legal realists argue
that at least one of the belligerents necessarily violated the U.N.
Charter, and many of them did so under the guise of Article 51
willing to use force in circumstances that seem to have little direct relevance to their
own national security goals"); William C. Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of
Compliance with the Laws of War, 36 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1243, 1246 (2004) (arguing that
although international law does not per se dictate state behavior, states are prone to
accept those legal obligations that do not significantly impose real constraints).
115. See Glennon, supra note 85, at 557 ("There is no point in trying to devise a
legal-sounding formula for an exception if no agreement exists on the scope of the
concept of 'aggression' that lies at the heart of the general rule.").
116. See Yoo, supra note 65, at 736.
117. See Franck, supra note 70, at 51-52.
118. Officially, the International Court of Justice maintains that force is only
lawful if it is used in conformity with the Charter. Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 1996 I.C.J. 225, 47 (July 8, 1996). However,
the court seemed to extend the armed attack threshold in Nicaragua, supra note 44.
In that case, the U.S. alleged that Nicaragua was providing various forms of support
to the FMLN, a rebel group in El Salvador. Id. at 1 146. The court did not find any
evidence of assistance from the Nicaraguan government to the FMLN, id. at 153,
but it did comment that evidence of aid to the rebels would constitute an armed
attack. Id. at 156. This was the first time the court implicitly acknowledged that
"indirect aggression" could rise to the level of an armed attack.
"119. This figure is based on data from the Militarized Interstate Disputes
("MID") database, discussed infra notes 133-139 and accompanying text. MID
coding rules are described in Charles S. Gochman & Zeev Maoz, Militarized
Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights, 28 J. CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 585 (1984). The MID definition of "hostility" is analogous to the U.N.'s
definition of "aggression." Id. at 587.
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protection. 120
D. IMPORTANCE OF STATE BEHAVIOR DURING THE U.N. ERA
As discussed in the section above, each of the four schools
appears interested, to some degree, in state behavior since the
adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945.121 Professor Murphy
argues that if the four schools were presented with a
comprehensive empirical analysis of state behavior, they might
find it easier to interpret the meaning of the Charter or,
alternatively, to determine whether a new norm of customary
law122 has emerged that supersedes the obligations set forth in
the Charter:
[I]nternational lawyers rarely explain their view as to the
circumstances that merit using state practice to establish an evolution
in the state of the law and too often provide only a cursory analysis of
such practice to see if those circumstances are met. Unfortunately, in
reading the literature one cannot help but feel that international
lawyers are often coming to this issue with firm predispositions as to
whether [preemptive force] should or should not be legal and then
molding their interpretation of state practice to fit their
predispositions. 123
Professor Murphy maintains that a thorough
understanding of post-1945 state behavior would "allow
international lawyers to move away from a binary discussion of
whether preemptive self-defense is lawful or unlawful, to one
that explores the subtleties and nuances of how states react to
varying levels of such force being used in different kind of
factual scenarios."1 24 By analyzing the empirical trends that
underlie customary law, scholars and policymakers would be
better equipped to create meaningful statutory law.
125
120. See Glennon, supra note 85.
121. See supra notes 52-120 and accompanying text.
122. For example, Arend and Beck contend that a new legal regime, known as
the "post-Charter self-help" paradigm has replaced Article 51 as the fundamental
rule governing the use of preemptive force. See AREND & BECK, supra note 33, at
178-79.
123. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 720.
124. Id.
125. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An
Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005) (arguing that
the only way to craft effective international law is through an integrated approach
that utilizes empirical evidence).
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III. USING DATA TO DETERMINE THE CUSTOMARY LAW
OF PREEMPTIVE FORCE
As discussed previously, customary law is best understood
by looking at empirical data of state behavior, yet the academic
legal community has largely neglected this type of analysis. 12 6
Conversely, quantitative analysis is a growing trend in the
scholarly political science literature concerning interstate use of
force, causes of war, and reliability of alliances. 127 Clearly,
quantitative datasets have helped to provide a foundation that
has allowed the scientific study of war to make significant
progress in recent years. 28  Nevertheless, the study of
international law remains theory-rich and data-poor, and, as a
result, much of statutory international law is based on legal
theory rather than on arguments constructed from hard
evidence. 29  International lawyers (whether government
126. See Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91
MICH. L. REv. 2075, 2085 (1993) (arguing that empirical research "remains to this
day the most neglected and ridiculously undervalued as well as the most potentially
fruitful branch of legal studies"). Rare examples of legal research in this area that
utilize quantitative data include Mariano-Florentino Cu~llar, Reflections on
Sovereignty and Collective Security, 40 STAN J. INT'L L. 211 (2004), William C.
Bradford, International Legal Regimes and the Incidence of Interstate War in the
Twentieth Century: A Cursory Quantitative Assesment of the Associative
Relationship, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 647 (2001), and Lori Fisler Damrosch, Use of
Force and Constitutionalism, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449 (1997).
127. Beginning the early 1960's, researchers nationwide have empirically
analyzed similar issues as part of the Correlates of War project. The initial scope of
the project was to cause data on the causes and consequences of war. Since then, a
multitude of datasets have been born covering a wide variety of phenomena in
international relations. There now exist data on alliances, material capabilities,
diplomatic recognition, international organizations and their memberships, inter-
and intra-state conflict, regime types, changes of government, cultural composition
of states, and several forms of political rebellion. See, e.g.,
http://correlatesofwar.org/.
128. For example, see Geller and Singer's review of the findings of 500+ large-N
analyses on the causes of war. DANIEL S. GELLER & J. DAVID SINGER, NATIONS AT
WAR: A SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1998).
129. See Gordon, supra note 126, at 2100 (observing that "doctrine is still the
staple commodity, even in the reviews edited at fancy schools that go in for the fancy
new stuff."); Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical
Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 329 (1989) ("[Tlwo forms of legal writing-
doctrinal and theoretical-account for almost the entire corpus of legal scholarship.
Only a tiny fraction is devoted to the gathering of new facts about how law actually
operates and affects us.") (emphasis in original); see also Bradford, supra note 114,
at 1247-48 (noting that the study of international law is "undernourished with
insights from other disciplines," and that the few studies that do use quantitative
data are "insufficiently rigorous and too underspecified" to offer any valuable
insights).
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attorneys, other practitioners, or academics) might benefit from
employing the empirical methods of political scientists who have
studied international relations for some time. 130 So submitted
Louis Henkin in his class study, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW
AND FOREIGN POLICY:
[T]he student of law and the student of politics ... purport to be
looking at the same world from the vantage point of important
disciplines. It seems unfortunate, indeed destructive, that they should
not, at the least, hear each other.
131
This Note seeks to bridge the divide between scholars of
international law and international relations and foster
interdisciplinary dialogue between the two concerning the use of
preemptive force.
Quantitative data provides a powerful tool for answering
the question posed by this note: whether any new set of rules,
beyond Article 51, govern the international relations among
states concerning the use of preemptive force. If critics of
Article 51 are correct that the statutory law is inapplicable to
modern world affairs because it does not accurately represent
the way states operate, then quantitative data has substantial
130. International law, at a fundamental level, is part of international relations.
The line between international law and international relations is difficult to draw in
an international system with no executive branch, no police, no prisons, so standing
army, no real legislature, and no real authoritative system of international
adjudication. See John IL Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of
International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 139-
40 (1996) (stating that there is no good reason for the fields of international law and
international relations to exist in "serene isolation" from one another). As Slaughter
Burley states,
If social science has any validity at all, the postulates developed by political
scientists concerning patterns and regularities in state behavior must
afford a foundation and framework for legal efforts to regulate that
behavior. For instance, if it could be reliably shown that a great-power
condominium was the best guarantee of international peace, then
international law and organization should accommodate and support an
arrangement that confers special privileges on a group of great powers. On
the other hand, if the prospects for peace hang on some other set of state
characteristics, then international security organizations and norms
designed to regulate the use of force should be reshaped accordingly. From
the political science side, if law-whether international, transnational or
purely domestic-does push the behavior of states toward outcomes other
than those predicted by power and the pursuit of national interest, then
political scientists must revise their models to take account of legal
variables.
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 205-06 (1993).
131. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 6 (1968).
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value to the extent that it explains state practice or customary
law.
A. THE MILITARIZED INTERSTATE DISPUTES DATABASE
The primary dataset used by scholars to study international
use of force is the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID)
database. 132 MID records disputes between states that become
militarized. In each case recorded, there is a threat, display, or
use of military force by one state directed towards the
government, official representatives, official forces, property, or
territory of another state.133 Militarized interstate disputes
exist because two or more states disagree about how to
peacefully resolve one or more issues. 34 The dataset covers the
years from 1815 to 2001 and contains information on over 2,300
disputes.
Militarized incidents vary significantly in magnitude,
reflecting differences between each type of action. MID creates
four categories to capture these disputes. Threats are "verbal
indications of hostile intent."135  Displays of force involve
military demonstrations but no combat interactions. 136 Uses of
military force represent sub-war military operation, such as
blockades, clashes, seizures, raids, and occupation of territory. 37
When militarized interstate disputes evolve or escalate to the
point where military combat is sufficiently sustained that it will
result in a minimum of 1,000 total battle deaths, they become
interstate wars.138 All four categories of force measured by MID
are prohibited under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter unless they
are allowed under Article 51 as acts of self-defense. 39
The categorization of each dispute represents the highest
action taken by the initiator in the entire course of the dispute,
not necessarily its first, or only, action. Many disputes that are
coded as uses of force began as threats or displays of force. This
132. The MID dataset is available for online download. Militarized Interstate
Disputes (v.3.02), available at
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%2OData/MIDs/MID302.html.
133. Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, & J. David Singer, Militarized
Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns, 15
CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCL 163, 168 (1996).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 170.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 171.
138. Id.
139. See U.N. Charter, supra note 46, at arts. 2(4) and 51.
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provides a good indication of dispute escalation. A hostility level
that only rises to the level of a threat or display of force implies
that the combatants were able to resolve the dispute without
inflicting actual military force. When the hostility level reaches
a use of force, there is evidence that the combatants could not
(or did not try to) resolve the conflict without resorting to arms.
B. MEASURING PREEMPTIVE INITIATION - DEFINITIONS AND KEY
ASSUMPTIONS
For purposes of this Note, self-defense is categorized as
either legal or illegal under the U.N. Charter. Generally, a state
is prohibited from threatening, displaying, or using force under
Article 2(4), unless it has suffered the requisite "armed attack"
necessary to legally justify its actions under Article 51.140
Therefore, a state that resorts to force because it has been
attacked engages in legal self-defense, per the terms of the U.N.
Charter. On the other hand, a state that has not suffered an
"armed attack," but nevertheless believes that such an attack is
imminent, will also claim that Article 51 justifies its "defensive"
actions. This type of anticipatory self-defense is not allowed
under the plain language of Article 51 and, therefore, is
technically illegal.141 Anticipatory self-defense is the same thing
as preemptive force. 142 To avoid confusion, this Note will only
use the term "preemptive force."
MID variables provide the framework to isolate cases of
preemptive force. This project does not recode any aspect of the
database. For each conflict, MID identifies the dispute
originator 43 and the revisionist. The originator is "the state
that takes the first militarized action."144 The revisionist is "the
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. "Preemptive force" is used to refer to the use of armed coercion by a state to
prevent another state from pursuing a particular course of action that is not yet
directly threatening, but which, if permitted to continue, could result at some future
point in an act of armed coercion against the first state. See Sean D. Murphy, Brave
New World: The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699, 704
(2005). Such preemptive force is, of course, "anticipatory" and might even be called
"preventive," but for purposes of this Note, such terminology is not used to describe
this form of self-defense.
143. The MID initiator is determined by looking at two separate variables: side
A and originator. Side A represents all states on the attacking side of the dispute,
including those states that joined after the first attack. Originator refers to all
states involved in day one of the conflict and excludes all joiners. Therefore, the
Side A originator is the attacking originator.
144. Jones, Bremer, & Singer, supra note 133, at 178.
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state or states that sought to overturn the status quo ante." 45
For purposes of analysis, the revisionist is the true
instigator of the dispute. The originator only represents the
state that took the first militarized action (threat, display, use,
or war). Revisionist is a better indicator of the true aggressor
because it indicates the state that actively pursues altering the
status quo and/or heightens tensions between the sides. For
example, MID codes Poland as the originator of World War II
because it fired the first shot against Nazi Germany, the
revisionist. Clearly, history shows that Germany was the true
aggressor in the conflict.
Combining originator and revisionist coding for each
dispute produces three key assumptions critical to an analysis of
the post-1945 U.N. era. First, a state that is both an originator
and a revisionist sought to change the status quo by actively
resorting to offensive military force. In general, these
"aggressive initiators" facially violated Article 2(4)'s prohibition
on offensive military force. Second, a state that is an originator
but not a revisionist did not actively seek to change the status
quo, but resorted to preemptive military force to prevent the
revisionist from achieving its aggressive goals. Although the
actions of these "preemptive initiators" also violated Article 2(4),
these states seemingly would have claimed justification for their
actions under a pragmatic reading of Article 51.146 Third, when
no state involved on either side of the conflict is a revisionist,
the state that first employs force is also a "preemptive initiator."
If neither side intended to heighten hostilities, the state that
took the first action presumably misperceived the intentions of
the other side. Because both sides truly wanted peace, there
would be no other good reason for the initiator to have used
force unless it mistakenly believed that its adversary was
aggressive. In taking action to preempt a threat that did not
exist, this initiator would nonetheless claim that it acted
preemptively to defuse a threat that seemed very real at the
time.
To summarize, an aggressive initiator attacks a non-
145. Id.
146. Nations do not regularly explain the legal basis of their actions, nor is it
clear how to determine the legal reasoning, if any, that a state engages in before
commencing a particular course of action. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 470. Even the
I.C.J., in most cases, does not investigate the attitude of a state on the legal
character of its actions. See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 537 (1993).
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threatening state in an attempt to alter the status quo. On the
other hand, a preemptive initiator believes that another state is
poised to employ force against it, so it chooses to take
preemptive action to preserve its first strike advantage.
Preemptive initiators do not want to resort to force, but feel
compelled to do so out of self-defense, despite the fact that the
plain language of the U.N. Charter prohibits their actions.
IV. INITIAL FINDINGS
As discussed in Part I, critics of Article 51 conclude that it
is inapplicable in the real world as a matter of statutory law.
Taking their views as true, the question remains whether state
behavior is governed by customary law that supersedes the U.N.
Charter. For there to be customary law, there must be evidence
of custom. Part II discussed how MID data is valuable for
determining custom, or consistent patterns of state behavior. If
states implicitly have agreed to a new set of rules concerning
preemptive force, then MID data will show consistency in state
behavior. On the other hand, empirical results that are random
or inconsistent would suggest that state behavior is not guided
by customary international law. The findings described in
detail below show that state behavior is remarkably consistent
and that customary law seems to govern state behavior.
A. USE OF FORCE IN THE U.N. ERA
From 1945 to 2001, there were 1,537 militarized interstate
disputes in the interstate system and an overwhelming majority
included the use of force by initiators. Of these, 61 were threats
of force, 418 were displays of force, 1,029 were uses of force, and
29 were full-fledged wars. The dispute's classification
represents the highest action taken by the initiator. For
example, a state that threatens force, displays force, and then
uses force is coded under the use of force category. 147
147. When two states both share responsibility for a dispute escalating to a use
of force, it is often difficult to identify the originator and revisionist. The
classification frequently rests in the eye of the beholder. What is intended as a
preventive, defensive action by one side may appear to be an offensive maneuver to
the other side. For example, state A builds a border wall to prevent state B from
ever attacking. State B thinks that state A built the wall so that its soldiers can
mount themselves at the top and fire down on state B. As a result, state B builds its
own wall, higher than state A's wall. This now confirms state A's (mis)perception
that state B is truly aggressive. It is not obviously clear how MID would code this
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Table 1 - Type of force employed by states since 1945
Threat Display Use War Total
n 61 418 1029 29 1537
% 4.0% 27.2% 66.9% 1.9%
A simple schoolyard analogy helps to clarify the point here.
Imagine that Biff, the school bully, intends to beat up George, a
feeble student, during recess to get his lunch money. Although
Biff has made no direct threat, George believes, for a variety of
reasons, that Biff will pummel him if George does not hand over
his lunch money. When class is released for recess, George
immediately runs to the baseball diamond to fetch a baseball
bat. He sneaks up behind Biff, clutching the bat in his hands,
poised to take a swing. When Biff turns around, George tells
him: "Try to take my lunch money and I'll whack you over the
head with this bat."148 How will Biff react? Biff might acquiesce
and assure George that he will not steal his money, thus
averting a major playground fight. George's hostility level
would be recorded as a display. In some circumstances,
however, Biff might issue a counter-threat, display his own
means of force (pull out a knife from his pocket), or use force
himself (kick George in the shin). If Biff chooses one of these
options and George retaliates by using the bat, George's
hostility level would be classified as a use of force. There would
be no record of George's initial threat of force.
Overall, the data indicate that most conflicts escalate into
uses of force. It is uncommon for a state merely to threaten or
display force and not use it. This implies that states do not tend
to make hollow threats. Despite the efforts of the U.N. Charter
to proscribe the use of force, states have remained relatively
trigger-happy when it comes to resolving disputes.
scenario. At some point, the creators of MID were forced to make a judgment call as
to which state wanted to change the status quo and which was the originator of the
dispute. The coding at the outset of the dispute is critical to how the event is
understood down the line. For example, a revisionist target that uses force as self-
defense to a preemptive initiator's threat or display of force does not become an
initiator for being the first state to actually resort to arms. This is because the
target was an aggressor before the initiator threatened or displayed force.
148. George might also whack Biff over the head without first issuing a verbal
warning. Such a "surprise attack" would immediately rise to the level of a use of
force.
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B. FREQUENCY OF PREEMPTIVE INITIATION
Preemptive initiators started 29.5% of disputes occurring
since 1945. In other words, nearly one-third of all conflicts were
initiated by non-aggressive states that would not have resorted
to force but for the aggressive behavior of an adversary. It is
safe to assume that these states seemingly claimed legal
justification for their actions under Article 51.149 However,
because they resorted to self-defense before suffering the
requisite "armed attack," they acted in direct violation of the
plain language and original intent of Article 51.150
C. ESCALATION IN CONFLICTS STARTED BY PREEMPTIVE
INITIATORS
Compared to aggressive initiators, preemptive initiators
were more inclined to threaten or display force rather than
actually use it. Of all instances of preemptive initiation, 41.8%
did not rise to the level of a use of force, compared to only 26.7%
for aggressive initiation. This data indicates that in a majority
of cases, a threat or display of force is enough to defuse the
aggressive intentions of a bully state. This result makes sense
because a preemptive initiator will cease its own aggressive
behavior once the bully target (the true aggressor) stops its
antagonism. Escalation is more prevalent when the initiator is
aggressive. It is critical to recognize that although disputes
started by preemptive initiators are less likely to escalate
compared to disputes started by aggressive initiators, those
started by preemptive initiators still escalate more often than
not.
Parsing the data by category of initiator for each type of
force allows for comparison of the propensity of preemptive and
149. This assumption does not posit that all "preemptive initiators," as defined
supra, acted preemptively. It would be a tremendously difficult task to review each
historical record and determine whether the initiator truly acted preemptively. The
benefit of MID data is that it allows researchers to measure overall trends.
Exceptions may exist to the general assumption, but, on the whole, the data is
reliable and captures patterns in state behavior as accurately as possible. Similarly,
this assumption does not posit that all "preemptive initiators" justified their actions
as self-defense. While it is true that many "preemptive initiators" made no attempt
to legally justify their actions, it is likely that if the international community forced
them to justify their actions, they would have cited self-defense under Article 51.
150. "Aggressive initiators," on the other hand, started 70.5% of disputes. In
these situations, one state resorted to force against an unthreatening target.
Because Article 2(4) prohibits all resorts to force, nearly three out of four disputes
involved a clear violation of Article 2(4).
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aggressive initiators to engage in each type of force. The data in
Table 3 shows when the dispute involves a display of force, but
no escalation to actual military combat, a preemptive initiator
was the instigator 42.6% of the time. When a dispute escalates
to a use of force, a preemptive initiator was the instigator in
25.2%, or about one of every four occurrences.
Table 2 - Category of initiator by type of force
Initiator type Threat Display Use War
Aggressive 4.5% 22.2% 71.1% 2.2%
Preemptive 2.6% 39.2% 57.0% 1.1%
Table 3 - Percentage type of force by initiator type
Initiator type Threat Display Use War
Aggressive 80.3% 57.4% 74.8% 82.8%
Preemptive 19.7% 42.6% 25.2% 17.2%
The findings in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that disputes started
by aggressive initiators are more dangerous and deadly than
those started by preemptive initiators. In cases of preemptive
initiation, the data cannot predict how the dispute would have
played out had the true aggressor attacked before it was
preempted, but figures on the other instances of aggressive
initiation provide a solid guide. Assuming that preemptively
initiated disputes would have followed the general historical
pattern of aggressively initiated disputes if the aggressor had
attacked first, then preemptive action worked as an effective
deterrent 51 to prevent many disputes from escalating.
There are significant consequences for international law if
states believe that preemptive force is an effective deterrent. At
a basic level, states will not abide by a statutory law, like Article
51, that prohibits all preemptive force. 152 The data presented
thus far confirms what critics have been preaching for years:
preemptive force is vital to state survival and cannot be
completely proscribed.
This is not to say, however, that there are no limits on
151. For a conceptual summary of the international relations theory of
deterrence, see Alexander L. George & Richard Smoke, Deterrence and Foreign
Policy, 41 WORLD POL. 170 (1989).
152. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 50, at 543.
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states' abilities to take preemptive action. While empirical
findings confirm that Article 51 is not authoritative on state
action, they do not necessarily imply the conclusion that no law
governs state behavior. If one accepts the premise of the
arguments offered many scholars, the question then becomes
whether any other set of rules, apart from Article 51, governs
state behavior. Either states exist in a system of pure anarchy,
where no norms guide behavior, or there is customary law that
limits preemptive force.
Trends in state behavior can be measured by looking at
changes over time. Instead of merely asking how many disputes
started by preemptive initiators have escalated to the level of a
use of force since 1945, legal scholars should be more concerned
with how these levels have changed over time. If hostility levels
increasingly rise to uses of force, then conflicts are more likely
to have escalated. Deterrence would be less and less effective
and security spirals would be prevalent. Conversely, a
decreasing rate in the use of force implies that deterrence is
becoming increasingly effective.
D. RATES OF PREEMPTIVE INITIATION OVER TIME
If customary law, in lieu of Article 51, governs the behavior
of states engaging in preemptive force, state behavior must be
regular and consistent. Fluctuating rates of preemptive force
over time would suggest that states do not condone a certain
amount of preemptive force as custom. When preemptive force
reaches an unacceptable level, states will no longer be able to
tolerate it and will impose harsh punishments on preemptive
initiators to deter future acts of preemptive force. On the other
hand, evidence showing that initiators use preemptive force at a
constant rate over time suggests that states permit that amount
of preemptive initiation as a matter of custom. 153
153. The following comparison is conceptually helpful here. Imagine that a
community decides to prohibit a previously unregulated activity, such as gambling
on sporting events. Ideally, all citizens would follow the law and no one would
gamble. Inevitably, some people believe they can gamble under the table, so they
place bets with illegal bookies. If illegal gambling becomes too prevalent, the
citizens will find ways to better enforce the anti-gambling law (perhaps through
better enforcement or stronger deterrents). Once the citizens find a more effective
method to weed out gambling, the amount of illegal gambling will drop. However, if
after years with little gambling, the citizens might decide that they might not need
to dedicate as much of their efforts to the anti-gambling cause. The society becomes
a little lax at enforcement and lenient with punishments for violating the anti-
gambling law. If a market still exists for sports gambling, the level of illegal activity
20071
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
Changes in rates of preemptive initiation over time are
measured by calculating moving averages of the data. Figure 1
displays the rate at which preemptive initiation has changed
over time. The moving average represents the average percent
of all militarized interstate disputes that were started by
preemptive initiators. It was noted above that, as of 2001,
preemptive initiators have started 29.5% of all disputes since
1945. The moving average represents what researchers would
have found had they conducted the same type of analysis in
previous years.
Overall, Figure 1 shows that the average rate of preemptive
initiation stabilized around 1970 and has remained constant
ever since. If a researcher had conducted this same study in
any year after 1970, she would have reached the same
conclusion reported in this Note: preemptive initiators start
about one out of every three militarized disputes.
It seems that this 30% level has been implicitly accepted by
states for over 30 years. If 30% were too high a level for the
international system to tolerate, there would be evidence of
downward trend in the average rate of preemptive initiation.
Conversely, if more states believed they could get away with
using preemptive force without suffering repercussions, there
would have been a spike in the aggregate amount of preemptive
force. The fact that the rate of preemptive force in the
interstate system has neither risen nor declined for three
decades indicates that some underlying consensus is embedded
in the fabric of the international legal system.
will rise again and the cycle will repeat itself. Over time, empirical patterns will
show that the society has not reached a consensus on how to enforce its gambling
laws. If the society eventually finds a consensus about how stringently to enforce
the laws, the rate of violation will stabilize over time.
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Figure I - Rate of preemptive Initiation over time
2005
Figure 2 demonstrates that not only are states resorting to
preemptive force at a steady rate, but they have also
consistently employed the same type of force. In other words,
the percentage of disputes that escalate to uses of force has
neither increased nor decreased. Table 2 reported that disputes
started by preemptive initiators are less likely to escalate than
those started by aggressive initiators, although disputes started
by preemptive initiators are still more likely to escalate than
not. Figures 2 and 3 confirm that this is not merely a recent
phenomenon. In fact, the rate at which preemptive initiators
will use a certain method of force has provided predictable
results since around 1960.
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Figure 2 - Type of force employed by preemptive Initiators over time
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Uses of force by preemptive initiators indicate either
unintended escalations/security spirals or surprise attacks.
Figures 2 and 3 show that the frequency of uses of force by
preemptive initiators is consistent over time, suggesting that
either (1) the percentage of disputes started by preemptive
initiators that escalate into uses of force has not fluctuated, or
(2) there are fewer escalations, but more surprise attacks.
Of all uses of interstate force, preemptive initiators have
been consistently responsible for the same proportion. If a
researcher in 1975 had calculated the odds that an observed
instance of force in the interstate system had been caused by a
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Across the board, empirical patterns of preemptive force in
the U.N. era provide undeniably consistent evidence that
customary law governs state behavior. The purpose of this Note
is not to say what the laws are, nor is it to argue what the laws
should be. Rather, the argument here is that there is
compelling evidence that customary law does exist and that
states do follow it. Just because Article 51 does not have
binding authority and is open to varying interpretations does
not mean that states operate in total anarchy and act without
consequences. The consistency of state behavior over time, as
demonstrated by the data, strongly suggests that states have
implicitly agreed to be bound by a set of rules that diverge from
the U.N. Charter. Customary law, not statutory language,
governs preemptive force in the international legal system.
E. STRENGTH OF PREEMPTIVE INITIATORS
If an implicit set of legal norms, apart from the U.N.
Charter, has governed state behavior during the U.N. era, they
should apply universally to all states.' Powerful states should
be held to the same standards as weak states and should not be
154. Restatement (Third) § 102, comment d (explaining that customary
international law is unitary in the sense that its obligations bind all nations except
those that "persistently object" during the development of the norm).
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exempt from limitations on anticipatory self-defense. The
quantitative data above reveals evidence that the overall
amount of preemptive force in the interstate system has
remained fairly constant during the U.N. era. This section looks
at the relative strength of states that act preemptively
compared to those that act aggressively.'55
To compute the relevant data, the MID database must be
merged with the National Materials Capabilities (NMC)
database. NMC is widely used by researchers to measure the
capabilities of a nation in a given year, regardless of whether
that state is involved in a conflict.'" Combining the two
databases generates data on the capabilities of each combatant
for a given militarized interstate dispute. In order to analyze
the strength of initiators compared to their targets (and
compared to other initiators), the initiator's capability for the
year in which it instigated the dispute is measured as a
percentage of the aggregate force of all combatants at the time
of initiation. Thus, an initiator with a relative capability score
of 0.5 is equally as strong as its target because it holds 50% of
the force in the dyad. Likewise, an initiator with a relative
capability score of 0.75 is three times as powerful as its target.
Table 4 reports the results of the MID-NMC merger.
155. Others have research the linkage between capabilities and escalation, see
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, & Ethan R. Zorick, Capabilities,
Perception, and Escalation, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 15 (1997), but this author is
unaware of any empirical studies that have accounted for initiator type.
156. NMC uses six indicators-military expenditure, military personnel, energy
consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population-as
the basis for its Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) score, coded by
year. J. David Singer, Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material
Capabilities of States, 1816-1985, 14 INT'L INTERACTIONS 115 (1987). NMC is
available for online download at
http://cow2.1a.psu.edulCOW2%2OData/Capabilities/nmc3-02.htm.
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Table 4 - Relative capabilities of Initiators, by initiator type and type of force
Ar esslve Initiators
<.25 .25-.5 .5-.75 >.75 Total
Threat 12 9 8 20 49
Display 38 41 57 104 240
Use 210 139 153 268 770
War 6 8 0 10 24
Total 266 197 218 402 1083
% of total 24.56% 18.19% 20.13% 37.12%
Preemptive Initiators
<.25 .25-.5 .5-.75 >.75 Total
Threat 4 2 1 5 12
Display 26 30 48 74 178
Use 77 45 50 87 259
War 2 0 1 2 5
Total 109 77 100 168 454
% of total 24.01% 16.96% 22.03% 37.00%
Consider first the data on preemptive initiators only.
Preemptive initiators tend to be stronger than their targets, but
not by a significant amount. Preemptive initiators were weaker
than their targets about 40% of the time and stronger than
targets in roughly 60% of disputes. Preemptive initiators were
very weak (at least three times weaker) compared to their
targets 24% of the time. They were very strong (at least three
times stronger) compared to their targets 37% of the time. The
variance between capabilities of preemptive initiators is only
slightly distinguishable.
Table 5 shows the percentage of force in each category used
by preemptive initiators, broken down by capability levels.
Notice that when preemptive initiators were very weak,
disputes were more likely to escalate.15 7  Even when the
157. It makes sense that disputes started by very weak initiators are the most
likely to escalate. If state A is over three times as strong as state B, state A will not
be overly intimidated by state B's threats. State A believes, because of its
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preemptive initiator was less than three times as weak, the
dispute was still more likely to escalate than if the preemptive
initiator was stronger than its target. If the preemptive
initiator was stronger than the target, the dispute escalated
roughly 50% of the time, no matter the size of the initiator's
advantage in capabilities. 
58
Table 5 - Percentage of force type by preemptive
initiators, by relative capability
Preemptive Initiators
<.25 .25-.5 .5-.75 >.75
Threat 3.67% 2.60% 1.00% 2.98%
Display 23.85% 38.96% 48.00% 44.05%
Use 70.64% 58.44% 50.00% 51.79%
War 1.83% 0.00% 1.00% 1.19%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Now reconsider the data in Table 4 on preemptive initiators
compared to aggressive initiators. The similarities between
frequencies of initiation by capability level are remarkably
similar. Grouped by relative capabilities, the percentage of
states that initiates disputes is almost identical between
preemptive and aggressive initiators. This suggests that a
state's capability relative to its target does not predispose it to
act preemptively rather than aggressively. Assuming that
initiators have similar capabilities, a dispute is just as likely to
escalate whether the initiator acts aggressively or preemptively.
As a result, initiator strength is not as good of a predictor of
dispute escalation as is initiator type.
Sections B and C showed, respectively, that: (1) rates of
preemptive initiation appear steady over time; and (2) rates of
capabilities advantage, that it can easily defeat state B on the battle field, so it does
not hesitate to escalate the conflict. If the battle is not as quick and cheap as State
A intends, then State A will have miscalculated on some level, but this is beside the
point. What is important is that state A has less of an incentive to settle the dispute
and give in to the demands of an inferior assailant.
158. This result also makes sense. If state A is stronger than state B, state B
will not want to escalate a conflict when it is threatened by state A. State B believes
that it will be defeated by state A in a military battle because state A has superior
capabilities. Therefore, state B will prefer to settle the dispute without resorting to
arms.
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dispute escalation where the initiator was preemptive appear
steady over time. Now, the data indicates that initiator
strength has little predictive power. Combining these findings
yields the conclusion that initiator strength is not a cause of the
long-term stableness in rates of preemptive force. The fact that
initiator strength has little effect on initiator behavior provides
further evidence that legal norms, apart from Article 51, exist
and apply equally to all states.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH
This Note presented three main quantitative findings.
First, the rate of preemptive initiation in the interstate system
has remained stable during the U.N. era. Second, the behavior
of preemptive initiators when they do employ force has also
been consistent. Third, the strength of preemptive initiators
seems to only have a modest effect, if any, on their behavior.
These main findings combine to provide strong evidence that
customary law now significantly constrains and shapes the
behavior of all states, regardless of their capabilities.
What do these findings mean for the study of preemptive
initiation, strategic policies, and the future of international law
in this area? If preemptive initiators are acting consistently
over time, then more study of anticipatory self-defense is
warranted. There are three priorities. First, scholars must
learn to better identify preemptive initiation in case studies and
develop coding rules so that it is easier to agree on the
phenomena being observed. Over time, this will also help
empirical legal studies to produce more fine-grained analyses of
preemptive initiation. For example, the imminent threat and
qualitative threat schools argue that the "armed attack"
requirement of Article 51 must be expanded. The current data
only sheds light on the type of action initiators took at the
highest level of the dispute. Detailed data does not exist on the
actions of revisionists who provoked initiators to attack
preemptively. A fine-tuning of the data by historians and
political scientists will allow researchers to study the motives of
preemptive initiators, not just the consequences of their actions.
This next step is crucial because it might shed light on the opino
juris component of customary law: whether preemptive
initiators believed they were acting in compliance with
international custom.
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Second, scholars must figure out what it is about the U.N.
era, apart from the U.N. Charter, that shapes the new legal
regime and causes initiators to behave consistently. Answers
may lie in increased balancing,59  increased defense
160 161 162dominance, presence of joiners, variations in transparency,
and changes in the political and economic organizations of
states.163 Future research should expand upon the quantitative
research here and test some of these propositions. In general,
the legal community should focus more on empirical
observations while political scientists should fine-tune the study
of less tangible, non-material variables of dispute initiation such
as willpower, strategy, and nationalism.
Third, scholars must carefully analyze the extent that
misperception and miscalculation play in decisions for
preemptive initiation.6  If preemptive initiators are
increasingly making bad assessments of their opponents'
159. See generally STEPHEN M. WALT, THE ORIGINS OF ALLIANCES (Robert J. Art
& Robert Jervis eds.,1987) (describing the robustly balancing world of defensive
realists).
160. Id.
161. Joiners are states that enter a dispute after the first day. Joiners may play
a significant role in determining whether a state chooses to act preemptively, Scott
Sigmund Gartner & Randolph M. Siverson, War Expansion and War Outcome, 40 J.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 4, 12 (1996), whether the conflict escalates (or de-escalates),
Thomas J. Christensen & Jack Snyder, Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting
Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity, 44 INT'L ORG. 137, 166 (1990); Randolph M.
Siverson & Joel King, Attributes of National Alliance Membership and War
Participation 1825-1965, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (1980), and whether other allies
will enter the conflict, Brett Ashley Leeds, Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The
Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes" 47
AM. J. POL. Sci. 427, 436 (2003).
162. See generally Alexandru Grigorescu, International Organizations and
Government Transparency: Linking the International and Domestic Realms, 47 INT'L
STUD. Q. 643 (2003).
163. See generally Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Can
Interdependence Work? in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ENDURING CONCEPTS AND
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 119 (Robert J. Art & Robert Jervis, eds., 8th ed., 2007);
ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER (2001).
164. The scholarly literature on misperceptions and miscalculations as causes of
conflict is enormous. The most widely cited works include: GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE
CAUSES OF WAR (1973); ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1976); Robert Jervis, War and Misperception, 18 J.
INTERDISC. HIST. 4 (1988); Robert Jervis, Hypotheses on Misperception, in AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: THEORETICAL ESSAYS (G. John Ikenberry, ed., 1989); Jack S. Levy,
Misperception and the Causes of War, Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems,
36 WORLD POL. 1 (1983); STEPHEN VAN EVERA, CAUSES OF WAR: POWER AND THE
ROOTS OF CONFLICT (1999).
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intentions 165 and acting to preempt threats that are illusory,
then any legal system that allows preemptive initiation needs
serious reevaluation.
Concerns about misperception and miscalculation are
especially important in a world increasingly troubled by
terrorists, rogue states, and WMD. In many ways, a legal
system that allows a certain amount of preemption also
encourages a preemptive initiator to deploy WMD as the
ultimate first-strike. 6 Conversely, a state will be more inclined
to act preemptively if it suspects that its adversary possesses
WMD.
167
The customary law governing preemptive initiation appears
predicated on the concept of deterrence. It seems that states
may have agreed to allow a certain amount of preemptive force
because it served as an effective deterrent to more dangerous
threats and prevented the outbreak of military force in many
circumstances. But, this worldview is inapplicable to terrorists
and rogue states-those most likely to threaten international
security in the modern world-because terrorists and rogue
states are unlikely to be deterred.
Even if customary law governed state behavior in the post-
Charter era, one main concern is that these rules were already
made obsolete by the U.S. adoption of preemption as a
legitimate strategy. Legal norms that would have prohibited
certain instances of anticipatory self-defense in the past might
be incapable of controlling the behavior in other parts of the
world. By recharacterizing their intentions as preemptive, self-
interested states like China, North Korea, Pakistan, or
members of the Arab league might claim the legal entitlement
to attack, respectively, Taiwan, South Korea, India, and
Israel.6 ' Even worse, these states might see an incentive to
"preempt probable preempters," causing the classical Prisoner's
Dilemma. 16
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This Note cannot speak to individual cases such as North
Korea-South Korea, and does not want to overstate the specific
implications of its general findings. The most important policy
implication is to make policy makers more aware that when it
comes to using preemptive force, states appear to abide by
customary law, not statutory law. For statutory law to be
meaningful and effective, it should better reflect state behavior
by codifying customary law. Through empirical analysis, the
normative standards set by international law may become
clearer and more helpful for states in ordering their relations,
thus promoting greater stability for interstate relations. If at
some point there is an effort to amend the U.N. Charter or to
supplement the Charter with more detailed criteria for uses of
force, a comprehensive understanding of state behavior among
international lawyers will be essential.
